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Nuclear Weapons Storage in Russia 
A Cooperative Approach to International Security in the 1990s*
Thomas A Wuchte
Lack o f safe storage facilities is the mam obstacle facmg Russia in its efforts to dismantle the nuclear arsenal 
o f the former Soviet Union the plutonium from Russian weapons must be locked up in a secure 
storage facility while permanent options are considered The plutonium presents more danger from either 
accidents or terrorist diversion now
—General William Bums 27 July 1992 *
Introduction
The stability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime will remain doubtful as long as the Russian Federation 
and United States are unable to facilitate the dismantlement and secure storage of the nuclear arsenal of 
the former Soviet Union Russian and U S officials have sought a joint solution to the potential dangers 
arising from a vast nuclear arsenal that was once scattered across the former republics of the U S S R The 
overall objective is the return of all nuclear weapons to the territory of the Russian Federation Despite 
the successful return of all the tactical nuclear weapons to Russia shortly after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union doubts remain about the likelihood that Ukraine Belarus and Kazakhstan will return the 
strategic nuclear weapons remaining on their soil In addition recent events in Russia indicate that the 
more conservative forces in the Russian government do not share Bons Yeltsin s willingness to cooperate 
with the United States The United States must formulate policy m an increasingly unstable political 
environment Precisely because of this uncertainty the United States must endeavor to integrate its 
collaborative efforts so that regime shifts in the nuclear republics of the former Soviet Union do not 
weaken existing agreements This paper presents an empirical case study of the efforts taken to resolve 
the storage problem in the Russian Federation
Core Issues for Analysis
Since the aborted coup m the Soviet Union in August of 1991 few topics have received more attention 
than control of and accountability for nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union Control of these 
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons has cast arms control and East-West relations in the post Cold War 
era into an unfamiliar framework A unified state was replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) a collection of mdependent states that pick and choose when to cooperate The thousands of 
nuclear weapons that Russia cannot safeguard or dispose of in an expeditious and economically feasible 
manner remains at the forefront of any discussion between the United States and Russia During a fact 
finding mission led by Senators Sam Nunn Richard Lugar John Warner and Jeff Bingaman m March of 
1992 Russian parliamentary officials and scientific experts emphasized that the lack of a dedicated 
facility for long term storage was a major bottleneck in efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons 2 
There have been both positive and negative aspects of the emergent policies of Russia and the United 
States m response to this problem
In the overall discussion of U S -Russian cooperation three issues are of central importance First 
there must be an appraisal of Russia s nuclear weapons principally those considered ready for 
dismantlement and of whether or not the weapons and the fissile matenals they contain pose a threat to 
the nonproliferation regime Second current efforts should be examined in order to understand the
* Tills paper completed in summer 1993 is based on work done by the author while a graduate student in the Master s program of 
the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign The views expressed m this paper are those of 
the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army Department of Defense or the U S 
Government
1 Russia Turns to Washington for Weapons Waste Disposal, World Environment Report 18 no 16 (4 August 1992) 1 2
2 Sam Nunn and others Trip Report A Visit to the Commonwealth of Independent States March 1992 17
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apparent and real problems facing the Russian Federation as the two sides attempt to resolve the storage 
dilemma issue in a cooperative manner Third the endeavor itself can be viewed as offering insight as to 
Russia s evolving reliability as a partner with the West in matters of arms control disarmament and 
international security
Framing the Study
The Bush administration responded to the disintegration of Soviet nuclear control with a senes of 
seemingly discrete and uncoordinated measures a decision to reduce U S tactical nuclear weapons m 
Europe to elicit Soviet concurrence the establishment of a fund to aid former Soviet weapon scientists out 
of fear of their engagement elsewhere with unfriendly nations and more recently the earmarking of funds 
to help with the dismantlement of nuclear weapons after it became obvious that Russia lacked the 
resources to carry out this task on its own The most promising of these steps was the funding for nuclear 
weapons dismantlement made available m FY92 by the Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (commonly 
known as the Nunn Lugar amendment) and subsequent additions in FY93 that brought the total to $800 
million 3 The United States has decided to pursue aggressively a course that mcludes monetary support to 
enhance Russia s control of its nuclear weapons and related technologies
Although it is too early to evaluate the Clinton administration s nuclear policy it appears that 
staunching proliferation will receive at least a similar emphasis as under the Bush administration Ashton 
B Carter Director of the Harvard Project on Cooperative Denuclearization has become Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Strategic Security and Counterproliferation a new position in the Pentagon 
whose responsibilities mclude overseeing the implementation of Nunn-Lugar funds for weapon 
dismantlement. Moreover the Clinton administration added further funding another $400 million for 
dismantlement in FY94 In addition restrictive measures on spending these funds in place during the 
Bush administration are to be eliminated 4 Thus there has been no loss of continuity between 
administrations
Two different arguments may be made to explain why both Russia and the United States have decided 
to pursue a cooperative policy in nuclear matters Realists would argue that this cooperation does not 
mark a significant departure from the realpolitik set of norms and rules that characterized the Cold War 
balance of power However there is growing evidence that a more cooperative global approach to 
problem solving is evolving This later approach includes a mix of techno economic assistance and 
political assurances If the latter is the trend of the future then the proposed joint effort to build a storage 
site m Siberia may well signal the prospective course of East-West relations Measured against these two 
ideas (global cooperation versus realpolitik ) the U S decision to assist the former Soviet Union appears 
obvious on one hand and a radical departure on the other
The flexibility of the United States and Russia in reaching beyond Cold War patterns will determine 
much of their success or failure in solving the storage problem For this case study cooperation will be 
measured against four results These four are explained below and used later to assess the value of the 
current cooperative efforts
Timing—The greater the degree of U S involvement, the faster the storage problem can be solved 
Through cooperation Russia and the United States can minimize the penod when dismantled weapons or 
fissile material remain outside of a permanent storage facility subject to lesser security and inadequate 
accountability procedures
Spillover—Cooperation with the United States will introduce the Russians to different and potentially 
better construction and infrastructure management systems The U S Army Corps of Engineers is working
3 Dunbar Lockwood Bush Clears Way for Weapons Dismantlement, Security Aid Arms Control Today 22 no 4 (May 1992) 
16 21
4 A number of restrictive measures during the Bush administration made the use of Nunn Lugar moneys difficult. As the 
democratization process in Russia continues the Clinton administration intends to eliminate these restnctions See Dunbar 
Lockwood U S Security Aid ] loves Slowly to Former Soviet States Arms Control Today 23 no 6 (July/August 1993) 26
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closely with officials and technical experts of the Russian Federation on the design and construction of the 
storage facility Russia has long tried to ameliorate problems in its infrastructure management system 
often with little success
Trust—Assistance by the United States can help alleviate tensions that exist among the conservative 
elements in both Russia and the United States Despite the radical changes in Russia and reduced 
tensions coming from the end of the Cold War many U S policy makers still fear a resurgence of a more 
aggressive Russian foreign policy
Understanding—Involvement can help the United States better understand Russia s transition to 
democracy and its new foreign policy objectives By undertaking cooperative projects the United States 
will be in a much better position to gauge Russia s reliability as a partner and its capacity to work more 
closely with the U S m the future
Appraising Nuclear Weapons
For more than thirty years the United States and Soviet Union engaged m dialogue to control nuclear 
proliferation and reduce the threat of a nuclear conflict Negotiations and measures focused almost solely 
on strategic weapons systems With the Cold War now a matter of history the United States is at a 
critical juncture in defining its nuclear arms control policy with respect to the Russian Federation and the 
other newly mdependent states of the former Soviet Union that inherited parts of the Soviet strategic 
arsenal (Belarus Kazakhstan and Ukraine) Planned reductions in strategic nuclear weapons have 
exceeded the dreams of even the most optimistic arms control negotiators of the Cold War era The 
actual likelihood that nuclear weapons would be used by either Russia or the United States is at the 
lowest level since the start of the Cold War In spite of these positive movements the analysis below 
indicates that uncertainty over Russia s nuclear arsenal raises a new set of concerns In many respects 
the potential for nuclear proliferation and subsequent use by emerging or undeclared (defacto) nuclear 
states is greater than during the Cold War The United States has been slow to establish an effective 
policy to cope with the multiple dimensions of this new problem
Numerous recent statements from the Russian Federation and the other newly mdependent Soviet 
successor states provide conflicting accounts about the security of the smaller land based nuclear weapon 
systems Such statements deal with matters that may be separated into four categories (1) loss of 
political and military control (2) security during movement for dismantlement (3) inadequate storage and 
accountability and (4) nuclear technology transfer to nonnuclear states Political or military control 
concerns the question of who really has possession of the various nuclear weapons systems and the ability 
to authorize their use Movement of weapons for dismantlement can lead to proliferation if it is not done 
carefully The likelihood of achieving the optimistic goals that have been stated by political leaders for 
the safe removal and destruction of nuclear weapons are not viewed with uniform credibility by military 
officials and academicians within Russia. Stated simply—the more quickly remaining strategic nuclear 
weapons are removed from the former republics the more likely safeguards and accountability will be low 
Nuclear technology transfa' is a nightmare potentially involving highly skilled former Soviet scientists 
seeking employment with the highest bidder through the sale of fissile material and even weapons or 
weapon components themselves When the four categories of problems are viewed as a whole the 
greatest threat of proliferation appears to come from the tactical nuclear warheads that are undergoing or 
scheduled for dismantlement5 In particular the lack of adequate and secure storage in Russia of the 
fissile material presents the most troubling problem
Exact data on the number of nuclear warheads is difficult to obtain various sources report different 
tallies Baseline figures for nuclear weapons have been difficult to establish In its preface the Nuclear 
Weapons Databook indicates the paucity of reliable information as follows *Withm the U S intelligence 
community there is often no empirical truth about the composition and characteristics of Soviet [nuclear]
5 Thomas A Wuchte “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union A Cause for Alarm? Military Review 
forthcoming
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TABLE 1 Nuclear Warheads of the Former Soviet Umon
Republic
Strategic
Offensive
Strategic
Defensive
Land Based 
Tactical
Naval
Tactical Total*
Russia 9 650 1 450 4 325 2 750 19 000
Ukraine 1 300 125 1 9 8 0 5 0 0 4 0 0 0
Kazakhstan 1 150 125 5 2 5 1 8 0 0
Belarus 100 125 8 4 5 IS O 1 2 5 0
Georgia 75 2 4 5 3 2 0
Azerbaijan 75 2 2 0 2 9 5
Armem a 7 5 1 2 0 1 9 5
Turkmenia 75 SO 1 2 5
Uzbekistan 7 5 3 0 1 0 5
Moldova SO 4 0 9 0
Kirgizia 7 5 7 5
Tajikastan 7 5 7 5
Lithuania 1 2 5 2 0 0 3 2 5
Latvia 1 2 5 6 0 1 8 5
Estoma 1 2 5 1 4 5 2 7 0
Total 12 200 2 800 8 800 3 400 27 000
Notes Totals do not add precisely because of rounding Numbers m bold italics indicate warheads returned to Russia 
shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Umon at the end of 1991
Soutce The figures are combined from the July/August and November issues of The Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists 
Estimated Soviet Nuclear Stockpile (July 1991) July/August 1991 48 and Where the Weapons Are November 
1991 49
forces much of the information about Soviet nuclear weapons (even at high levels of security 
classification) is speculative ”6 By mergmg data from several sources the Table 1 illustrates the 
categories of warheads and their location m early 1992
The rapid removal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for storage before dismantlement has 
scattered those weapons m areas that are either now or are likely in the near future to be subject to 
political unrest7 Tactical stockpiles total approximately 12 200 warheads divided among those formerly 
assigned to missiles fighter/bombers ships and artillery associated with thirty one different systems 8 
One can see that the potential for loss of control and diffusion of these nuclear warheads is a major policy 
issue for Russia and the United States
Threats Posed by Nuclear Weapons of the Former Soviet Union
Because of the economic decline and the difficult political climate within Russia the Russian Federation 
has turned to the United States for assistance in the building of a storage facility for nuclear weapons 
This request from the Russians marked a sharp departure from previous examples of cooperation with the 
United States The U S government concurred with Russia s proposal to build a facility using funds in part 
from the Nunn Lugar amendment The commitment of U S funds in the Nuclear Threat Reduction Act 
offers a concrete example of the emerging style of Russian and U S cooperation Instead of hiding the 
problem or minimizing its seriousness Russia left little doubt about its need for substantial U S 
assistance That decision supports the belief that the Russian Federation wants to participate more fully in 
the international community—helping where it can and looking for assistance when it is needed Such 
cooperation is needed to avert scenarios that have great potential to threaten global security
One can imagine several scenarios wherein consequences of the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
leads either to the use of nuclear weapons or to their proliferation A project earned out by the RAND
6 Thomas B Cochran and others Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 4 Soviet Nuclear Weapons (New York Harper & Row 
1989) XV
7 Ashton B Carter and Owen Coté Transport, Storage and Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons in Cooperative 
Denuclearization eds Graham Allison and others (Cambridge Mass Center for Science and International Affairs 1992) p 97
8 “Estimated Soviet Nuclear Stockpile (July 1991) 48 (footnote 7)
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corporation The Day After in the U S SJR ” explores several different policy dilemmas m a 
hypothetical future in the post Soviet area One scenano envisions strong central leadership leading to 
increased tensions among republics of the former Soviet Union As a consequence of such tensions 
republics threaten to use nuclear weapons against one another dunng conflict A second scenano foresees 
enhanced proliferation through the transfer of technology or fìssile matenal9 Regions such as the Middle 
East South Asia, and Northeast Asia are all eager to improve their latent weapons capabilities and are 
likely end points for nuclear technology of the former Soviet Union Many of the scenanos studied by 
Rand see nuclear weapons as the future source of increased instability m the world Such projections if 
correct will leave policy makers groping for solutions to problems never envisaged dunng the Cold War
Following the unsuccessful coup in the Soviet Union m 1991 the U S government appeared divided 
over the long term implications for nuclear weapons and international order Then Secretary of Defense 
Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colm Powell were pessimistic They agreed 
with findings such as m the RAND corporation study and saw the breakup of the Soviet Umon as leading 
to further proliferation They felt that pursuit of nuclear weapons would not cease and other countries 
would seek out materials and technology in support of national nuclear programs 10 On the other hand 
President Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, apparently believed that proliferation 
could be contained within the existing frameworks and the structure of the CIS 11 There is little empirical 
evidence to support this more optimistic view however
As post Soviet politics continue to expenence rapid change it is important for the United States and 
the Russian Federation to fully recognize the potential for proliferation In addition to the five declared 
nuclear powers several countries are already considered undeclared nuclear powers 12 It appears that the 
Clinton administration is placing an even greater emphasis on the threat of nuclear proliferation than past 
administrations
The Politics of Nuclear Weapons
The politics of nuclear proliferation associated with the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union is 
complex Four areas need clarification before discussing the proposed nuclear weapons storage facility 
(1) an assessment of which successor states should ultimately possess nuclear weapons (2) whether the 
former republics with nuclear weapons at the time of the breakup are likely to want to retain them (3) the 
urgency predicating swift resolution of current dismantlement problems and (4) opportunities for bilateral 
action between Russia and the United States An understanding of each of these four areas allows one to 
make judgments about the cooperative efforts to curb the dangers of nuclear proliferation in a rapidly 
changing political environment
Leaving the weapons m the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union was never a 
desirable option Russia is the only former republic that has facilities for dismantlement of nuclear 
weapons 13 Consequently negotiations for a storage site have not extended beyond the Russian 
Federation Once the Russian military had completed the process of returning all the tactical nuclear 
weapons to Russia it moved one step closer to being the inheritor of all the nuclear weapons of the former 
Soviet Union
9 Marc Dean Milot Roger Molander and Peter Wilson “The Day After in the USSR, RAND Corporation Handout Update 
#1 8 January 1992 p 3-8 See also Joseph A Yager Prospects fo r Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in a Changing Europe Center for 
National Secunty Negotiations (CNSN) Paper 4 no 1 (1992)
10 Many trends support such a view For example Egypt Iran Israel and Brazil have established sophisticated military 
production capabilities Susan Willett Controlling the Arms Trade Supply and Demand Dynamics Faraday Discussion Paper No 18 
(November 1991) p 9
11 William M Arkin Damian Durrant and Hans Knstensen “Nuclear Weapons Headed for the Trash The Bulletin o f the Atomic 
Scientists (December 1991) 19
12 Jonathan Dean and Kurt Gottfried A Program for World Nuclear Security (Cambridge Mass Umon of Concerned Scientists 
February 1992) p 13
13 John D Morrocco Soviet Military Breakdown Worries US as Control Over Nuclear Arms Splinters Aviation Week & Space 
Technology 16/23 December 1991 p 21
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Nevertheless Ukraine Kazakhstan and Belarus possess strategic nuclear weapons Kazakhstan and 
Belarus have remained committed to the eventual removal of all the nuclear weapons on their territories 
Kazakhstan ratified the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I in July 1992 joining Russia and the 
United States Belarus did the same in February 1993 and has permitted withdrawal of the weapons to 
proceed 14 The obstinate player is Ukraine and accordingly it warrants further discussion
Ukraine composes fifty two million people and a land mass greater than France In the post Soviet 
hierarchy of successor states Ukraine stands second in population and in importance behind Russia 
Ukraine desires at least equal if not preeminent status with Russia1S This has led to a foreign policy for 
Ukraine that challenges Russia at almost every juncture Such a fractious attitude causes great alarm in 
the United States but tends to strengthen the domestic position of Ukraine s president Leonid Kravchuk 
One can summarize Kravchuk s successes to date in one way he has managed to distance Ukraine from 
most things Russian16 In fact, this policy probably doomed the CIS from being a meaningful political 
entity from the beginning
The priorities of Ukraine appear to be threefold, establishment of a competent and large military 
economic reform as free as possible from Russian influence and strengthening of its position as a regional 
power The military pnonty is justified by the perceived threat of a larger Russian military Achieving a 
planned force of 400 thousand would make Ukraine the second largest military in the region Unsettled 
border disputes and the historical hegemony of Russia seem adequate reasons to warrant such a force for 
the Ukrainian people 17 Economic reform must of necessity proceed parallel to Russia m most areas The 
Ukrainians however fear influence by Russia with its dominant economy Ukraine s response has been to 
court Western investors by offering incentives that at least match those of Russia18 The current 
government in Ukraine is composed of many former communist party members The leaders portray 
themselves as representing the mandate of the vote for mdependence yet much of their support is soft 
Most Ukrainians voted for independence from Russia not necessarily in favor of Kravchuk s government19 
Deeds now need to prove that the electorate chose a government capable of economic reform and not just 
capable of removing the vestiges of Russian hegemony
Although Ukraine has recently taken positions that shed doubt on the likelihood that all the remaining 
nuclear weapons on its soil will be returned as stipulated by the London Protocol to the START treaty 
these positions do not seem viable in the long run given possible pressures Russia and the United States 
can bring if Ukraine remains obstinate Given the value of fissile material in warheads ($100 million for a 
metric ton of uranium) the Ukrainian government receives an obvious benefit by permitting dismantlement 
of nuclear weapons on its soil and receiving payment for the fissile material20 Retention of the warheads 
as part of a Ukrainian nuclear arsenal is not probable It is U S policy not to offer further aid to Ukraine 
without compliance with existing treaties and agreements 21 It is likely that Ukraine will use the nuclear 
weapons on its soil as bargaining chips but the weapons will eventually be returned to Russia for 
destruction 22
Another important point is the speed with which nuclear weapons can be dismantled and the resulting 
fissile material stored The chief nuclear engineer of the Russian Defense Ministry calculates that the
14 Obstacles Loom for Implementation of START 2 ” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 10 no 3 (1993) 1 3
15 Adrian Karatnycky "The Ukrainian Factor ” Foreign Affairs 71 no 3 (1992) 102
16 Raman Solch anyk “Kravchuk Defines Ukrainian-OS Relations Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report (hereafter 
RFE1RL Research Report) (13 March 1992) p 7
17 Kathleen Mihalisko “Defense and Security Planning in Ukraine Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute Report 
on the USSR (hereafter Report on the USSR) 3 no 49 (1991) 16
18 Vitaly Korotich “The Ukraine Rising Foreign Policy 85 (1991 92) 81
19 Bohdan Nahaylo “The Birth of an Independent Ukraine,” Report on the USSR 3 no 50 (1991) 3-4
20 Yuny Kostenko “Ukraine s Nuclear Weapons Good or Evil, Golos Ukratny 29 August 1 September 1992 Trans m Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service USR 92 119 (hereafter FBIS) (18 September 1992) p7 9
21 Graham Allison Ashton B Carter and Philip Zehkow “The Soviet Arsenal and the Mistaken Calculus of Caution 
Washington Post 29 March 1992 p C3
22 Robert L  G alluci, “Disposing of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union " US Department o f State Dispatch (10 August 
1992) p 632-634
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removal and destruction of nuclear warheads within Russia will take a minimum of nme years without 
Western assistance One could argue that the U S should let the Russians take care of their own problems 
and that nme years is not an unreasonable amount of time However the estimate is based on the most 
optimistic of assumptions including the full cooperation of the former republics 23 Neither the Russians 
nor the United States should nsk the potential consequences of a protracted process of dismantlement
Success or failure of reducing the former Soviet Union s stockpile of nuclear warheads will largely be 
determined by the extent to which Russia and the United States can cooperate The CIS did not succeed 
in becoming a mechanism for unifying the military or maintaining close economic coordination between 
the republics of the form»’ Soviet Union Although the other former republics particularly Ukraine 
Kazakhstan and Belarus are important, the dismantlement of nuclear warheads is primarily an issue that 
the Russian Federation must work out with the United States Russia is the nuclear weapon successor 
state for treaty obligations of the former Soviet Union As the implicit leader of the West, the United 
States has accepted much of the responsibility for assisting Russia with its nuclear dilemma
We can now look at the construction of nuclear storage facilities m Russia in detail As we shall see 
many of the desired positive outcomes are accompanied by problems
Storage of Nuclear Weapons
The huge numbers and diversity of the tactical nuclear warheads now back in Russia requires new storage 
facilities and better accountability following dismantlement Simply moving all the tactical nuclear 
weapons from the other republics to Russia has not eliminated their potential threat The apparent 
unwillingness of Russia or the United States to extend treaty verification beyond strategic nuclear 
weapons could backfire m the long term 24 Verification of specific warhead and launcher destruction plus 
the elimination of certain conventional weapons is mandated by the combined START I and n  
Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreements 
The U S Department of Defense however approaches further verification accords cautiously With 
regard to the Short range Nuclear Forces (SNF) and naval systems we do not envision any formal 
verification regime although we are willing to discuss possible confidence building measures with the 
Soviets n2S Without an adequate storage facility many U S and Russian officials fear that the potential 
for further proliferation will worsen
Representatives from the Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) have 
recommended bilateral safeguards in order to prevent transfer of the fissile material and/or warhead 
components to unauthorized sources The proposal is that after warhead dismantlement fissile materials 
would be tagged stored and then subject to procedures that incorporate verification and strict 
accountability 26 Published reports however indicate Russia has no secure centrally located storage 
facility for the thousands of weapons it expects to dismantle A Moscow news story in early 1992 
mentioned a statement by Vitaly Shlykov Deputy Chairman of the Russian Defense Committee 
concerning the removal and storage of nuclear warheads Shlykov expressed concern about security for 
the detached warheads because Russia did not have a facility to store them 27 Ultimately adequate 
storage and safeguards are needed to ensure a successful process of dismantlement
As part of its arms control policy the United States has decided to pursue a path that includes monetary 
assistance for the building of a nuclear storage facility near Tomsk 7 (see Figure 1) There are a great 
number of challenges that a project of this magnitude will face However cooperation between the two 
parties as they attempt to check one of the most damaging consequences of the breakup of the Soviet
23 Enc Schmitt, Soviet Atom Move is Ahead of Schedule ” New York Tunes 28 February 1992, p A4
24 The United States and Russia have not taken any measures to establish a venficauon regime for tactical nuclear weapons See 
Christopher Paine and Thomas B Cochran “So Little Time So Many Weapons So Much to Do ” The Bulletin o f the Atomic 
Scientists (January/February 1992) 14
25 Ibid p 14
26 Ibid p 14
27 Unsecured Warehouses Store Nuclear Weapons Kuranty 15 January 1992 2 Trans in FBIS (24 January 1992) p 6
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Union will have positive benefits enhancements m Russian management techniques sharing of 
construction methods and improvement in the security for both parues The entire process will serve as 
an exercise of confidence building verification and increased transparency especially because the 
United States will gam access to the closed city of Tomsk 7 Using Nunn Lugar amendment funds the 
United States and Russia have started to negotiate the joint design of a storage facility for the warheads 
and fissile material
The Department of Defense controls the funding and has given the U S Army Corps of Engineers 
responsibility for coordinating the design of the storage facility with Russia Initially the U S Army Corps 
of Engineers wanted to overlay Western construction methods on the project. However the Russian 
construction industry follows a completely different set of rules and norms Early euphoria for a quick 
solution has been tempered by the reality of working with a construction industry still dominated by deep 
seated practices from the communist era The examples cited below outline the difficulties facing 
cooperation between Russia and the United States and what efforts have been taken to overcome them
Construction m the Post Soviet Economy
In spite of the desire to work with the United States officials within the Russian Federation are skeptical 
of the U S Corps of Engineers Russian military construction battalions are not considered a part of the 
proposed Tomsk 7 construction project even though m the past they have been integral to the development 
of Siberia. Russia s construction battalions do not reflect the civil military relationship of the U S Army 
Corps of Engineers Moreover the majonty of the work of the battalions has beai characterized as 
slipshod 28 This legacy from the Russian military battalions makes the involvement of the U S Army 
Corps of Engineers difficult What seems a simple decision to many—the allocation of millions of dollars 
and the building of a storage facility—has caused both the Russians and the U S Army Corps of Engineers 
to examine past practices and construction procedures Because of skepticism on the part of the Russians 
the Corps of Engineers has had to carefully explain both itself and management and construction 
procedures used by the United States
In an effort to win the trust of the Russian government, a senes of meetings and exchanges have 
occurred The Corps of Engineers introduced Russian construction representatives to the system used by 
the United States for large scale infrastructure management Likewise representatives from the Russian 
Federation hosted visits to the area near Tomsk 7 and the Russian design headquarters for hardened 
underground structures 29 These exchanges increased the confidence of both Russian and U S officials 
Introducing the concepts used by U S Army Corps of Engineers has proven successful a more difficult 
task has mvolved the prospect of including Russian civilian contractors in the Tomsk 7 project
Tomsk 7 has its own construction firm that is anticipating a bounty of U S currency for construction of a 
storage facility capable of holding thousands of nuclear warheads The firm Khimstroi employs more 
than ten thousand people around the Siberian city of Tomsk 7 The director of the department scheduled 
to construct the facility found it difficult to understand the practice of competitive biddmg when it was 
explained during a meeting m August 199230 As the sole contractor in the area, the director could not 
comprehend how another firm from outside Tomsk 7 could receive the contract to build the storage site 
The U S Army Corps of Engineers however urges competitive biddmg procedures even though such a 
procedure appears inappropriate to the director of Khimstroi The management of this large kombinat 
reports directly to the Deputy Minister of MINATOM 31 Khimstroi as the only construction firm near
28 Leslie Dienes “Economic and Strategic Position of the Soviet Far East. Development and Prospect, in The Soviet Far East 
Geographical Perspectives on Development ed Allan Rodgers (New Yoik Routledge Chapman and Hall, Inc 1990) p 281
29 John Trout telephone interview with the Special Projects Office at the Omaha Nebraska headquarters of the U S Army Corps 
of Engineers 16 November 1992
30 Yuli M Gelman interview conducted at the Omaha office of the U S Army Corps of Engineers Omaha Nebraska 4 August 
1992
31 Victor N Michailov Conversion of the Nuclear Complex Nuclear Disarmament and the Safety of Nuclear Tests at Novaya 
Zemlya ” Swedish National Defense Publication Lectures and Contributions 15 July 1992
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FIGURE 2 Organization of Kombinat Khimstroi (Department 7 is the general contractor responsible for the 
construction of the proposed storage facility)
Tomsk 7 previously enjoyed a monopoly in the area s construction Figure 2 shows the organizational 
structure of MINATOM and Khunstroi
It is important to understand that the past and the present construction practices m Russia are not 
easily separated Construction management in the former Soviet Union followed four dominant theories 
over the past several decades32 Most importantly none of these four theories incorporated Western style 
macroeconomics
Combining the West with Russia
One must view a firm like Khimstroi within the context of Russia and its outdated infrastructure and 
management style Under communism major infrastructure development was not the responsibility of any 
smgle governmental organization unlike the situation in the United States and the U S Army Corps of 
Engineers In Russia each major industrial institution pursued and acquired resources for its own 
development Often construction firms stole material or labor for their own personal use and were at odds 
with one another It is not surprising that competitive bidding seems alien to Khimstroi Nevertheless the
32 James C Thompson and Richard F Vidmer Administrative Science & Politics in the USSR & the United States Soviet 
Responses to American Management Techniques 1917 Present (South Hadley Mass Addison Wesley Publishing Company 1979) 
p 140 149
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Russians have been willing to integrate U S contracting procedures into their system As the only firm 
within hundreds of miles it is likely that Khimstroi will ultimately receive the contract
The proposed construction project has also highlighted one important point During the initial 
negotiations over the construction of the storage facility the U S Army Corps of Engineers initially 
approached the Russian officials with the perspective of carrying out the project with U S contractors 
However Russians especially the members of the former communist bureaucracy tend to look on all 
foreign ideas negatively After many decades of propaganda espousing the Soviet way U S methods and 
intrusion serve as an embarrassing reminder that communism did not work Russians have tended to be 
more receptive to assistance in terms of joint projects or stock companies The Russians have the talented 
people and technical know how but they lack the experience of working with ILS management 
methods 33 U S patience is vital as the Russians develop their own busmess acumen In the long run this 
development will create future commercial opportunities for both U S and Russian firms By sharing 
technology management techniques and general construction methods each side will profit U S 
mvolvement ml the construction of a storage facility near Tomsk 7 above all else must strive to integrate 
on an equal basis the Russian team with the U S team and its construction and infrastructure management 
practices
Ultimately ¡one can hope that large scale construction and infrastructure management within Russia 
will be transformed With a legacy of military involvement in construction monopolies a model for 
Russia similar to the U S Army Corps of Engineers may work best The Corps of Engineers traces its 
history back to 1775 Unlike the Russian case the involvement of the military m large projects has 
tended to produce a stronger construction industry within the United States During the last fifty years the 
Corps has shed its military labor force and retamed officers only at the management level Currently the 
Corps civil works program employs 28 000 civilian plus 350 officers Their major areas of concern 
include waterway development, flood control the space program and management of the nation s 
wetlands 34 The infrastructure of the United States is well served by the Corps of Engineers A military 
organization like the U S Army Corps of Engineers under the civilian control of the Russian government 
would enhance efforts to move toward a more Western system of democratic control The decision to 
implement such a reorganization however rests with the Russian government
Discussion with the Russians over the construcuon of a nuclear weapons storage facility reveals a 
pattern of progress mixed with obstacles Thus far the overall effort has been successful in overcoming 
the barriers discussed above Each obstacle has been resolved after understanding that cooperation will 
best solve the storage problem More obstacles will certainly anse The Russian Federation and United 
States are currently working on the final design of the storage facility3S We can now look at the progress 
thus far and compare it to the four results discussed earlier in this case study
Russia A Cooperative Partner?
A successful outcome of the joint construction project would reduce the cntical nuclear weapon storage 
problems faced by the Russian Federation The project will also help improve nuclear non proliferation 
and international stability
In this last part of my analysis I consider whether the joint effort marks a change m not only relations 
between the United States and Russia but within the existing rules and norms that make up the 
international order Many political scientists view the pursuit of international cooperation as an elusive 
brass ring” that cannot really be achieved an attitude that bodes ill for the future Such scholars have 
adopted the classic balance of power approach concerning international relations nation states are
33 V E M inkovandM  Stolov Brief Description o f the FSU Construction Management System with Particular Regard to the 
Construction o f Storage Facilities Argonne National Laboratory Special Projects Office Report 92/4 April 1992 2 3
34 Essayons (Let Us Try) Public Affairs Office US Army Corps of Engineers (Washington D C Government Printing Office 
1991) p 13
35 John Trout 16 November 1992
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compelled above all to preserve their security to survive and succeed 36 There is a smaller but growing 
group of international relations analysts who advance the premise that peace and a cooperative learning 
process in avoiding conflict has been in place over hundreds of years37
One can look at the current cooperation between the Russian Federation and the United States and 
assess whether or not this represents a step forward m international relations If progress is occurring 
similar collaborative efforts should become the norm as nations seek to minimize conflict that is more and 
more viewed as no longer worthwhile In contrast realists would argue against the significance of 
cooperation m dealing with the nuclear storage problem They acknowledge that states have changed in 
many ways but believe the fundamental nature of international relations has remained much the same 
Nation states may seek reasonable and worthy ends but they cannot grasp how to reach them38
The results thus far of this jomt U S -Russian effort to solve the storage problem and reduce the nsk of 
nuclear proliferation do not support the pessimistic future that realists portray The endmg of the Cold War 
cannot be fully understood as a function of military balance of power or nuclear deterrence39 The 
Russians have chosen cooperation in order to solve the potentially catastrophic implications of 
uncontrolled nuclear proliferation Despite many obstacles both sides appear committed to whatever 
level of cooperation is necessary for a successful resolution This commitment discredits arguments that 
the international order cannot advance
Cooperation—the Example of Nuclear Weapons
In the introduction to this paper I indicated actions the United States has taken in response to the 
dissolution of the former Soviet Union in connection to potential nsk associated with nuclear weapons 
including loss of political and military control of the weapons secunty during movement dismantlement 
sites inadequate storage and accountability and nuclear weapon technology transfer Having discussed 
the proposed storage facility it is worthwhile to look at the other efforts to see if they also support the 
premise of greater cooperation as an international practicality
A small portion of the money from the Nunn Lugar amendment has been allocated for an International 
Science and Technology Center m Moscow In addition to $25 million from the United States similar 
amounts are being contributed by the European Community (EC) Japan and Russia Kiev will also 
receive a $10 million grant for a separate organization the Ukrainian Science Center These centers will 
not hire scientists directly but rather will fund international projects using former Soviet weapon and 
defense expertise Such projects are expected to generate a source of income for the many Soviet 
scientists currently unemployed. The projects will be reviewed after two years and additional funding may 
be forthcoming at that time 40 Under a separate initiative the U S federal government will pay 116 
Russian scientists a total of $90 thousand for research work in Russia that employs their talents as nuclear 
fission experts Although salaries paid to Russian scientists may not be comparable to that of a U S 
scientist, this should help stem the flow of scientists looking for work outside Russia 41 Both of these 
initiatives are clear examples of a greater interest on the part of the United States m cooperating with 
Russia
At present, the majority of the money allocated from the Nunn Lugar amendment is primarily 
designated to assist Russia in the building of the storage facility The United States appears to have 
adopted a view that cooperative measures must encompass a more long term perspective The Senate
36 Kenneth N Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (Reading Mass Addison Wesley Publishing Company 1979) p 110
37 PaulW  Schroeder “A Great Step Back from a New World Order Swords and Ploughshares 5 no 3 (Spring 1991) 3-4 see also 
Transformation o f  European Politics 1763 1848 (Oxford England Clarendon Press 1994)
38 Kenneth N Waltz, p 110
39 See Edward A Kolodziej What is Secunty and Security Studies?” Arms Control 13 no 1 (Apnl 1992) which concludes that 
the Cold War ended for several reasons that go beyond deterrence theory or the balance of power between East and W est
40 Edward J Dowdy science advisor to Ambassador Robert L. G alluci lecture given at the University of Illinois Urbana Illinois 
23 Apnl 1992.
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Foreign Relations Committee approved an increase in funding m FY93 and FY94 for the further 
implementation of initiatives stalled under the Nunn Lugar amendment42 This support sends a clear 
signal to the Russian Federation of U S desire to continue assisting in the resolution of the storage 
problem
Conclusions
U S financial aid for a Russian nuclear warhead storage facility will provide a strong foundation for 
minimizing the threat of nuclear proliferation posed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union Because of the 
cooperation achieved thus far four results have occurred already or will occur in the near term These are
Timing The Russian Federation desires to complete the design of the storage facility as soon as 
possible and begin construction m 1994 if possible U S assistance to bring this about will decrease the 
amount of time nuclear warheads remain m temporary storage sites an improvement over the current 
situation With the completed storage facility the process of dismantling nuclear weapons will probably 
be achieved m less time than the nine years discussed earlier Arms control reductions cannot be 
considered complete until the weapons are in a form for which there is no potential for military use
Spillover Initial Russian skepticism toward the U S Army Corps of Engineers has been replaced by 
admiration The Russians are considenng aligning their infrastructure system along Unes similar to that of 
the Corps As this project progresses other benefits should anse Current conditions show that the 
transition to a market economy m Russia is moving slowly at best Through a mix of economic and 
technical assistance in projects like the nuclear storage facility the United States can help the Russian 
Federation deal with the complexities of a free market economy
Trust Although initially skeptical both the United States and Russia are cooperating more fully m 
the realm of international secunty U S access to the formerly closed city of Tomsk 7 sends a clear signal 
to U S conservatives Cooperation strengthens existing relationships and helps forge new ones If the 
current Russian government loses its constitutional mandate long term stability with the United States 
can only be assured if protocols that are difficult to undo are m place The greater U S involvement the 
less likely that previous agreements will lose their importance
Understanding International cooperation especially through the UN or similar organizations seems 
to be the preferred choice for the Russian Federation Russia appears to want to be integrated with 
existing Western secunty structures This is a positive indication of Russia s emerging foreign policy 
One must balance this trend with a modicum of guarded caution Whereas Bons Yeltsin remains pro 
Western a significant portion of the Russian population does not share this view At best one cannot 
assume the current political climate will be permanent Instead one must regard it as a positive sign and 
nurture the existing good will
The four results listed above radicate that the cooperative effort between the United States and the 
Russian Federation despite many obstacles is producing positive payoffs The commitment to jointly 
solve Russia s nuclear predicament appears to have allayed some of the fears that tinger following the end 
of the Cold War There is now greater transparency concerning the dimensions of the nuclear dilemma 
within Russia. By allowing greater access the Russians are gaining U S assistance for a needed storage 
facility In this way cooperation has allowed the United States a clearer picture mto Russia s foreign 
policy aspirations in the 1990s
The task remaining is nevertheless a daunting one The elimination of nuclear weapons must continue 
to be a process in which Russia and the United States nurture and build upon existing agreements As the 
Russian Federation establishes its own foreign policy the initial indicators are that it prefers cooperation 
with the United States Russia s willingness to participate m international forums indicates a society that 
is moving mto an era of greater global cooperation However if treated by the United States as a weaker
42 GAO Raises Questions in Evaluation of Nuim Lugar Implementation ” Nuclear Waste News 12 no 31 (1992) 3
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vassal Russia will likely resist further collaborative efforts Russia is becoming a more reliable partner 
with the United States but its willingness to participate is tempered by an inability to economically 
support many initiatives No one can predict the future of the Russian Federation In spite of this 
uncertainty we must continue to press forward with new ideas and discard Cold War prejudices It would 
be lamentable if U S Russian relations fail to encompass forward looking objectives Successful 
cooperation will mcrease the stability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and further integrate the 
emergent global international community Both results are worthy goals
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